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Notes
SERVICEMEMBERS' RIGHTS UNDER THE FERES DOCTRINE:
RETHINKING "INCIDENT TO SERVICE" ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court demon-
strate that the "incident to service" test of Feres v. United States' will
stand as the threshold requirement for recovery for servicemembers in-
jured by negligence or constitutional torts at the hands of any govern-
ment employee, whether military or civilian.2  Specifically, any
servicemember attempting to recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) 3 or seeking redress for a constitutional violation, must bear the
difficult burden of proving that the injury was not "incident to service." 4
However, there is no universal definition of the phrase "incident to ser-
vice." 5 Consequently, injured servicemembers are subject to diverse in-
1. 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). For a full discussion of the facts and holding
in Feres, see infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
2. United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054, 3063 (1987); United States v.
Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2069 (1987). For a full discussion of these decisions,
see infra notes 67-75 & 77-85 and accompanying text.
It is important to note that "[t]he Supreme Court has never held that the
Feres doctrine is applicable to intentional torts." However, in view of these re-
cent decisions, there is little doubt that the doctrine would bar such a cause of
action. Comment, Expansion of the Feres Doctrine, 32 EMORY L. J. 237, 255 (1983);
see Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (3d Cir. 1981) (intentional
tort action barred by Feres doctrine). This Note will not treat the topic of inten-
tional torts by government employees, and will focus solely on the "incident to
service" exception for suits in negligence and constitutional torts.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1976). The statute states: "The United States
shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgement or for punitive
damages." Id. § 2674.
The original Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 60 Stat.
842 (1946), was repealed in 1948 and reenacted in its present form at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2401(b) and 2671-2680. For further discussion of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, see Note, Military Medical Malpractice and the Feres Doctrine, 20 GA. L.
REV. 492, 501 n.14 (1986).
4. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
5. See Miller v. United States, 643 F.2d 481, 483 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd en
banc, 643 F.2d 490, 494 (8th Cir. 1981) (servicemember who was given permis-
sion to perform part-time construction work on base barred from recovery be-
cause he was not on leave, was on the base to which he was assigned, and the
work was related to the military mission); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d
1007, 1013 (5th Cir. 1980) (degrees of active duty status range from furlough or
leave to mere release from day's chores. A servicemember with permission to be
absent from duties for four days and five nights is closer to former than latter.);
(175)
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terpretations of this language, wherever they may serve. This
inconsistency has resulted in incongruous and often inequitable results.
Consider, for instance, the off-duty servicemember attending to per-
sonal business, who is injured by a negligently driven military vehicle
when it collides with his privately owned motorcycle. On these facts, the
victim may recover FTCA damages in Georgia, yet be denied relief in
Texas. 6 Because of its inequities, this doctrine has received heavy criti-
cism from courts and legal commentators. 7 Nevertheless, it is unlikely
that Congress will displace this doctrine.8 Therefore, the injured ser-
vicemember must rely on the Supreme Court of the United States to
Woodside v. United States, 606 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1979) (where ser-
vicemember's activity and the Armed Forces are closely associated and naturally
related, activity will be deemed "incident to service"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980); Henninger v. United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815-16 (9th Cir.) (recovery
for injury to soldier already processed for discharge barred as incident to service
because soldier still on active status), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); see also
Comment, Solving the Feres Puzzle: A Proposed Analytical Framework For "Incident to
Service", 15 PAC. L.J. 1181, 1183 (1984) (irratic application of factors by lower
courts has resulted in inconsistent court decisions).
6. Compare Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349 (11 th Cir. 1987) (off-duty
servicemember riding motorcycle off base was not injured incident to service)
with Mason v. United States, 568 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1978) (off-duty ser-
vicemember riding motorcycle on base was injured incident to service).
7. See Bozeman v. United States, 780 F.2d 198, 200 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The
Feres doctrine is a blunt instrument .... The original rationales for the holding
in Feres have been undercut."); Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96, 97 (3d Cir.
1983) ("We are forced once again to decide a case where 'we sense the injustice
... of [the] result.' "), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1023 (1984); Scales v. United States,
685 F.2d 970, 974 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying Feres "reluctantly" and "regret[ting]
the effects" of conclusion), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Henninger v.
United States, 473 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The precise rationale for the
Feres rule and its continuing validity have been the source of some confusion.");
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1247 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) ("Perhaps a pathbreaking appellate court might discern enough emana-
tions of Supreme Court disquiet to predict that Court's future conduct in limit-
ing Feres."); Bennett, The Feres Doctrine, Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 383, 385 (1984) ("disciplinary considerations that underlie the
[Feres] doctrine in fact demand its reversal."); Schwartz, Making Intramilitary Tort
Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J. 992, 992-99
(1986) (overly restrictive Feres doctrine should be replaced to allow claims
against more serious misconduct); Comment, The Feres Doctrine: Has It Created
Remediless Wrongs For Relatives of Servicemen?, 44 Prrr. L. REV. 929, 952-53 (1983)
(courts indiscriminately dismiss claims by servicemembers by improperly analyz-
ing Feres and its underlying policies); Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military
Personnel Have Access to FTCA Recovery?, 77 MicH. L. REV. 1099, 1099-1100, 1102
(1979) (Feres doctrine unnecessarily deprives military personnel of redress for
harms in the name of policies already fulfilled by express exceptions to FTCA).
8. In recent years Congress has discussed proposed legislaion that would
modify the FTCA and permit servicemembers to bring medical malpractice ac-
tions against the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987) (accompanying H.R. 1054); H.R. 1161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985);
H.R. 1942, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). However, the legislature has reacted
just as slowly as the judiciary in recognizing at least some rights of recovery for
the servicemember. See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299 (1983). For
2
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determine a specific definition of "incident to service" based on the un-
derlying rationales for the Feres doctrine, in order to achieve fairness and
predictability. 9
This Note will examine the development of the underlying ratio-
nales for the Feres doctrine and the current treatment of negligence and
constitutional torts under the doctrine.' 0 Several of the rationales origi-
nally proposed appear to have eroded over time, and today the "best
explanation" for the doctrine is to protect the military disciplinary struc-
ture. I1 Secondly, this Note will analyze the various definitions of "inci-
dent to service" employed by lower federal courts.12 Finally, this Note
will propose a test which balances the needs of the military command
and disciplinary structure against the need to make an appropriate rem-
edy available to injured servicemembers.' 3
II. BACKGROUND
The United States government enjoyed the protection of the sover-
eign immunity doctrine for many years. 14 A United States citizen in-
a full discussion of the Chappell decision, see infra notes 63-66 and accompanying
text.
The most recent proposed modification to the FTCA would allow ser-
vicemembers to recover for injuries sustained by medical malpractice in "fixed
military medical facilities." H.R. REP. No. 279, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987).
The Judiciary Committee's report concluded that "there is no reason why mili-
tary personnel bringing suit on their own behalf for medical malpractice should
result in any breakdown in military discipline." Id. The Committee further con-
cluded that this legislation would lead to (1) improved military medical care due
to the threat of suit, and (2) "improved morale within the military establish-
ment." Id.
For further discussion of military medical malpractice reform, see Note,
supra note 3.
9. See generally Note, In Support of the Feres Doctrine and a Better Definition of
"Incident to Service", 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 485 (1982).
10. See infra notes 14-85 and accompanying text.
11. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). But see United
States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2068 (1987) (Supreme Court relied on
"three broad rationales" to support Feres doctrine). For a full discussion of the
facts and holding in Shearer and Johnson, see infra notes 77-85 & 92-100 and ac-
companying text.
12. See infra notes 101-89 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 194-213 and accompanying text.
14. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (dictum);
see, e.g., United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). The sovereign
immunity doctrine evolved in English common law and was based on the theory
that the King, an individual sovereign, could not be sued in his own judicial
system. American courts adopted this doctrine to shield the government from
suits arising from its employees' conduct. Only Congress could waive this im-
munity. See also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1033 (5th ed. 1984); Jaffee, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1963). For a dis-
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jured in tort by a government employee had the singular remedy of
petitioning Congress to pass a private bill for relief.15 Eventually, this
unwieldy system proved to be an inadequate method of handling tort
claims against the government. Compelled to act, Congress enacted the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 16 Through the FTCA, the govern-
ment waived sovereign immunity and exposed itself to liability for per-
sonal injury and property damage caused by the negligence of any
government employee "acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment." 17 This waiver of sovereign immunity was not absolute, however,
since statutory exceptions were expressly included in the Act, including
exceptions for claims arising from "combatant activities" or "in a for-
eign country."' 8 It is significant that while military personnel were ex-
15. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140. For a full discussion of the procedures for enact-
ing such a bill, see Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal Govern-
ment, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 311, 311 (1942). See also Gelhorn & Lauer,
Congressional Settlement of Tort Claims Against the United States, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1955).
16. 340 U.S. at 140; see S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 29 (1946);
S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 24 (1946); H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 1-2 (1945); see also Note, supra note 9, at 488-90.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Section 1346(b) waives sovereign immunity against
suits for money damages due to the tortious conduct of government employees.
18. Id. § 2680(j)-(k). The specific exceptions to the Federal Tort Claims
Act are as follows:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regu-
lation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abuse.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement
officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Ti-
tle 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit or interference with contract rights ....
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
[Vol. 33: p. 175
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pressly addressed by these statutory exceptions, these exceptions did
not appear to bar all claims by military personnel.' 9
The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue in Brooks v.
United States,20 and interpreted the FTCA to allow at least some claims
by injured servicemembers. 2 1 In Brooks, two servicemembers, on au-
thorized leave and accompanied by their father, were riding in a private
vehicle on a public highway. They were injured in a collision with an
Army vehicle which had been negligently driven by a federal civilian em-
ployee.2 2 The Brooks Court found no evidence of any Congressional in-
tent to completely bar military claims under the FTCA, and permitted
the servicemembers to recover, after concluding that their injuries were
not sustained incident to service. 23 In its analysis, the Court cited the
specific exceptions for claims arising in a foreign country or out of com-
batant activities as evidence that Congress did not intend to foreclose all
servicemembers' suits under the FTCA.2 4
One year later, in Feres,2 5 the Court addressed the specific issue of
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(in) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a local bank of cooperatives.
Id. § 2680.
19. See id.; see also Heller v. United States, 776 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1985)
(servicemember's suit for wife's wrongful death at military hospital in Republic
of the Philippines barred by foreign country exception of FTCA); Broadnax v.
United States Army, 710 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (claim arising
out of medical malpractice in Army hospital in West Germany barred by foreign
country exception of FTCA).
20. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
21. Id. at 51-52. "The statute's terms are clear. They provide for District
Court jurisdiction over any claim founded on negligence brought against the
United States. We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but that
of a serviceman.' " Id. at 51.
22. Id. at 50.
23. Id. at 54. The Court distinguished the Brooks' car accident from "[a]
battle commander's poor judgment, an army surgeon's slip of hand, [and] a de-
fective jeep which causes injury." Id. at 52. This distinction was an initial at-
tempt by the Supreme Court to define what events comprise "incident to
service."
It is interesting to note that James Brooks, the father of the two ser-
vicemembers, who was also injured, recovered under the FTCA in his own right
without contest from the Government. Id. at 50 n.1.
24. Id. at 51; see also Note, supra note 8, at 491 n.51 (statutory construction
principles dictate that express exception precludes implication of other excep-
tions). It is important to note, however, that the Brooks Court cautioned, in
dicta, that a servicemember's claim for recovery for injuries suffered "incident to
... service" would present a "wholly different case," and in such an instance, the
results could be so "outlandish" that recovery could not be permitted. 337 U.S.
at 52-53.
25. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). All three cases considered by the Feres Court were
factually similar in that "each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough,
1988] NOTE
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whether a military servicemember could sue the sovereign for injuries
sustained incident to service, which under other circumstances would be
an actionable wrong.26 Rudolph Feres, an active duty naval officer, per-
ished by fire in his military barracks. 27 His widow alleged that the gov-
ernment was negligent in quartering Feres in an unsafe barracks with a
defective heating plant, and in failing to maintain a proper firewatch. 28
The Feres case was combined with two medical malpractice cases.2 9 The
Court concluded that the government was not liable under the FTCA
for injuries to servicemembers when the "injuries arose out of or in the
course of activities incident to service."'30 This decision stands as the
only judicial exception to the FTCA.3 l It is particularly significant that
sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces." Id. at 138. In
addition, these three cases raised the common legal issue of "whether the [Fed-
eral] Tort Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining 'incident to the ser-
vice' what under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong." Id.
26. Id. at 138. "This is the 'wholly different case,' reserved from our deci-
sion in Brooks ...." Id. (citation omitted).
27. Id. at 137.
28. Id.
29. Feres was combined with Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th
Cir. 1949), aff'd sub nom., Feres, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), and Griggs v. United States,
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), rev'd sub nom., Feres, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
In Jefferson, plaintiff underwent an abdominal operation in an Army hospital.
Eight months after his discharge, in the course of another operation, a towel,
"marked 'Medical Department U.S. Army' was discovered and removed from his
stomach." Feres, 340 U.S. at 137. Plaintiff was denied recovery. Id.
In Griggs, the district court dismissed the complaint of Griggs' executrix,
which alleged that Griggs died due to the negligent and unskilled medical treat-
ment by Army surgeons. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed and held that the FTCA allowed a cause of action. Id.
30. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146.
31. See Note, supra note 7.
It is interesting to note that the Congressman who drafted the FTCA did
not intend to preclude servicemembers. Representative Emmanuel Celler deliv-
ered the following oral statement to the YALE LAW JOURNAL in November, 1948:
The opinion of the Fourth Circuit [in Jefferson] is utterly erroneous
when it says that it was the intent of Congress to exclude a member of
the Armed Forces from the benefits of the Tort Claims Act. I am the
author of the bill, and I piloted it through the Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, the House Judiciary Committee, and the
House. Prior to its passage I worked on this bill for many years, and I
repeatedly offered it to successive Congresses before its final passage. I
had more to do with it than any other member. I never intended to
preclude a suit by a soldier. Despite the fact that the latter might have
various and sundry remedies for compensation, pensions, hospitaliza-
tion, preferences, etc., these benefits had nothing whatsoever to do
with, and are utterly unrelated to the right to sue under the Federal
Tort Claims Act .... We start off with the proposition in general that
the Government deliberately removes the defense of sovereignty, ex-
cept in the cases where the Act specifically makes an exception. The
exception cannot be implied; it must be expressed. The court cannot
read the exceptions into the law.
[Vol. 33: p. 175
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the Feres Court did not overrule its decision in Brooks. 32 Rather, the
Court carefully distinguished the facts comprising the two decisions.
The injuries sustained by the Brooks brothers were not sustained "inci-
dent to service" because the two servicemembers were "on furlough,
driving along the highway, under compulsion of no orders or duty and
on no military mission," unlike injuries sustained by the servicemember
performing duties under orders.3 3 This distinction between Feres and
Brooks was the Court's first meaningful attempt to clarify the "incident to
service" definition. 34
In Feres, the Court relied on three rationales for its decision.3 5 The
first Feres rationale, termed the "parallel private liability" rationale, rec-
ognized that the United States was liable under the FTCA " 'in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-
stances.' "36 The Court asserted that no parallel private liability could
exist since, inter alia, no American law has ever "permitted a soldier to
recover for negligence, against either his superior officers or the govern-
ment he is serving." 37 Additionally, the Court stated that there could be
no liability " 'under like circumstances' " since "no private individual
has power to conscript or mobilize a private army."'3 8 This parallel pri-
vate liability rationale was quickly recognized as a weak argument in sup-
port of the doctrine and was rejected by the Supreme Court.3 9
The second Feres rationale maintained that the "distinctively fed-
eral" relationship between the United States and its enlisted military
personnel would be undermined if the federal government was exposed
to local and geographically diverse tort laws as applied under the
FTCA.40 It was further suggested that "[i]t would hardly be a rational
Note, Military Personnel and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 58 YALE L.J. 615, 621 n.26
(1949).
32. 340 U.S. at 146. The Court distinguished the facts in Brooks by pointing
to the "vital distinction" that the Brooks' relationship to military service "was
not analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing duties under or-
ders." Id.
33. Id.
34. For further discussion of the Court's imprecise definition of "incident
to service," see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
35. 340 U.S. at 141-44. For a discussion of the three Feres rationales, see
infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
36. 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674).
37. Id. (footnote omitted).
38. Id.
39. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (injured
party cannot be deprived of his rights by resort to alleged distinction between
government's actions in "proprietary" capacity and in "uniquely governmental
capacity"); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66-69 (1955)
("[W]e would be attributing bizarre motives to Congress were we to hold that it
was predicating liability on such a completely fortuitous circumstance-the pres-
ence or absence of identical private activity.").
40. 340 U.S. at 142-44. The Court reasoned that servicemembers are not
free to choose where they will serve, and are frequently ordered to move from
1988] NOTE
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plan of providing for those disabled in service ... to leave them depen-
dent upon geographic considerations over which they have no
control .... 41
The third rationale for the Feres doctrine focused on the existence of
a compensation system for injured military personnel, 4 2 the Veterans
Benefits Act (VBA), which was deemed an exclusive remedy for service-
related injuries. 4 3 The Feres Court thought it unlikely that Congress in-
tended to permit additional recovery under the FTCA.
4 4
Later, in United States v. Brown,4 5 the Court recognized a fourth ra-
tionale. In Brown, a discharged veteran was allowed to recover damages
for a military doctor's negligence in the treatment of a knee injury, sus-
tained while on active duty, but negligently aggravated after his dis-
charge. 4 6 However, the Brown Court stated that Congress did not
intend to allow suits for injuries incident to military service because of
the potential undue interference with military discipline. 4 7 The Court
one duty station to another. Id. at 142. Therefore, "it makes no sense" and
"would hardly be a rational plan . . . [to leave servicemembers] ... dependent
upoh geographic considerations over which they have no control and to laws
which fluctuate in existence and value." Id. at 143.
41. Id. at 142-43. The Court recognized that the diverse substantive laws of
the several states would be "fair enough when the claimant is not on duty or is
free to choose his own habitat." Id. at 142.
42. Veterans' Benefits Act, 72 Stat. 1118, as amended, 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-362
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) (VBA grants survivor benefits and disability compensa-
tion without regard to "incident to service" inquiry).
43. 340 U.S. at 144-45. Thus, the exclusive compensation statute available
to the armed services (currently embodied in the VBA), as an exclusive remedy,
precluded further recovery under the FTCA. Id.
44. Id. The Court noted that the absence of any provision to adjust be-
tween the two compensation systems was "persuasive [evidence] that there was
no awareness that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries
incident to military service." Id. at 144.
This rationale was questioned by the Court four years later. United States
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954). The Brown Court noted that Congress had
given no indication that recovery under the VBA was an exclusive remedy. Id. at
113. In addition, the Court indicated that the proper treatment of the two ex-
isting remedies was to offset the FTCA recovery by the amount received under
the VBA. Id. at 111. This approach was also endorsed by the Court in the Brooks
decision. 337 U.S. at 53-54. Also, a similar approach is taken in the proposed
military medical malpractice reform legislation. For a discussion of this ap-
proach, see supra note 8.
Moreover, the Court in Brooks and Brown distinguished the VBA from work-
man's compensation statutes, where Congress had expressly provided for exclu-
siveness of remedy. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53; Brown, 348 U.S. at 113.
45. 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954). Peter Brown, while on active duty, injured
his knee, which rendered him unfit for further service. Id. While receiving med-
ical treatment after his discharge, the injury was aggravated by medical negli-
gence. Id. The Supreme Court decided that this injury did not occur incident to
service, since the negligence occurred after Brown's discharge, and allowed re-
covery. Id. at 112.
46. Id. at 110-11.
47. Id. at 112.
[Vol. 33: p. 175
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1988]
suggested that if servicemembers could bring suit alleging negligence
against other servicemembers, military discipline would be undermined
and civilian courts would be required to second guess military decision
making.48 Specifically, the Brown Court asserted that:
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his
superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on disci-
pline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under
the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or
negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the
Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that character. 49
Neither the FTCA nor the Feres Court identified military discipline as a
rationale for the Feres doctrine, yet the dicta in Brown has earned recog-
nition as the doctrine's most important rationale. 50
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 5 1 the Court reaf-
firmed its holding in Feres and asserted that three of the doctrine's four
rationales remain valid. The Court relied on two original Feres ratio-
nales and the military discipline rationale. Specifically, the Court relied
upon the following three rationales: (1) "distinctively federal relation-
ship," (2) alternate compensation eligibility, and (3) impact on military
discipline. 5 2 Moreover, the Stencel Court favored the military discipline
rationale as the strongest argument in support of the doctrine. 5 3 Addi-
tionally, in recent years, the Supreme Court has noted that the "distinc-
tively federal relationship" and "alternative compensation" arguments
are "no longer controlling. ' '54 Thus, the Court has repeatedly cited the
48. Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671-72
(1977). For a discussion of the holding in Stencel, see infra notes 51-53 and ac-
companying text.
49. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112 (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-43).
50. For a discussion of this "military discipline" rationale, see infra notes
92-100 and accompanying text.
51. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). An Air Force Reserve pilot, while flying a military
aircraft, executed an emergency ejection procedure. The aircraft's ejection
mechanism malfunctioned, and the pilot sustained severe and permanent inju-
ries. Donham v. United States, 536 F.2d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'd sub non.,
Stencel Aero Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The pilot sued
the manufacturer, Stencel and the United States. Stencel cross-claimed against
the government for negligence in the maintenance of the aircraft, which had
been in the government's exclusive custody. 431 U.S. at 668. The Supreme
Court held that the Feres doctrine barred both the plaintiff's claim and the manu-
facturer's cross-claim against the government. Id. at 672-74.
52. Stencel, 431 U.S. at 672-74. For further discussion of the Court's deci-
sion in Stencel, see Comment, supra note 2, at 247-49; Note, supra note 7.
53. 431 U.S. at 672-74. One author observed: "Although the Supreme
Court clearly favors the preservation of the military discipline rationale for the
Feres doctrine, the Feres Court's other rationales, with the exception of the paral-
lel private liability requirement, have not been totally abandoned in subsequent
Supreme Court decisions." See Comment, supra note 2, at 247.
54. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985). For a complete
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"military discipline" rationale as the "best explanation" for the doc-
trine.5 5 However, the precise status of the three rationales remains un-
clear in light of the recent Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Johnson.56 The five member majority of the Johnson Court articulated the
"three broad rationales" as the basis for its holding, without indicating
the weight to be accorded to each factor.
5 7
A. Feres Doctrine and Constitutional Torts: United States v. Stanley
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,58
the Court authorized a damages suit against federal officials whose ac-
tions violated an individual's fourth amendment rights, even though
Congress had not expressly authorized such suits. 5 9 The Bivens Court
noted further that such a remedy would not be available when "special
factors counselling hesitation" were present. 60 The Court soon ex-
discussion of the legal arguments in Shearer, see infra notes 92-100 and accompa-
nying text.
55. See United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2073 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57; Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 299
(1983); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963); Comment, supra note
2, at 245 & n.41.
56. 107 S. Ct. 2063, 2068 (1987) (Court "emphasized three broad ratio-
nales" underlying the Feres decision: (1) distinctively federal character of Gov-
ernment-soldier relationship, (2) alternate compensation eligibility, (3) impact
of suits on military discipline).
57. Id. at 2068-69. However, Justice Scalia, in dissent, characterized the
three original underlying rationales of Feres as so frail, that the military discipline
rationale emerged as the best explanation for the doctrine. Id. at 2073 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
58. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
59. Id. at 389. Petitioner, Bivens, alleged that agents of the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics "acting under claim of federal authority..." entered and searched
his apartment, manacled the petitioner, and arrested him, without a warrant for
either the search or the arrest. Id. The acts were further alleged to have been
effected without probable cause. Id. at 389 n.l.
60. Id. at 396. The "special factors" exception to the Bivens remedy is
based on the deference afforded Congress in matters of policy decisions. In
addressing the "special factors counselling hesitation," the Bivens Court referred
to two cases which illustrate that the judicially created remedy should not be
extended to situations where Congress has plenary power to make policy deci-
sions. Id.; see United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1954) (selection of
policy "involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised.
That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for
those who interpret them."); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,
305-06, 316 (1947) ("[T]he scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of
the relation between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally
derived from federal sources and governed by federal authority." This Govern-
ment-soldier relationship is properly within Congress' controls.); see also Case-
note, Constitutional Law-Military Enlisted Personnel May Not Recover Damages Frmi
Superior Officers for Violations of Constitutional Rights, Chappell v. Wallace, 103 S. Ct.
2362 (1983), 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 356, 362 (1984) ("In all cases in which the
Supreme Court has found the existence of special factors counselling hesitation,
the factors related to a possible judicial intrusion into areas the Court consid-
10
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panded the Bivens remedy to include remedies for other constitutional
violations, 6 1 but limited its application to situations without the pres-
ence of "special factors counselling hesitation." 6 2
In Chappell v. Wallace,63 the Court addressed the issue of whether
"special factors" counselled hesitation in a constitutional tort case in
which five United States Navy sailors sued their superiors, alleging racial
discrimination in the treatment they received aboard ship. 64 The Court
concluded that "[t]aken together, the unique disciplinary structure of
the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field constitute
,special factors' which dictate that it would be inappropriate to provide
enlisted military personnel a Bivens-type remedy against their superior
officers." '6 5 This analysis was particularly significant because the Court
ered reserved to Congress."). For further discussion of "special factors," see
Brodsky, Chappell v. Wallace: A Bivens Answer to a Political Question, 35 NAV. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1986).
61. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (federal officials deliberately
ignored medical needs of inmate in violation of eighth amendment); Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (plaintiff alleged Congressman discriminated on
basis of sex in violation of due process clause of fifth amendment).
62. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1982) (relationship between fed-
eral government and civil service employees was special factor counselling
against judicial recognition of Bivens remedy for violation of first amendment
rights).
63. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
64. Id. at 297. Five United States Navy enlisted personnel brought action
against the Commanding Officer, four Lieutenants and three noncommissioned
officers of the U.S. Navy warship to which they were assigned. Id. These five
enlisted members alleged "that because of their minority race petitioners failed
to assign them desirable duties, threatened them, gave them low performance
evaluations, and imposed penalties of unusual severity." Id. The sailors alleged
that this racial discrimination violated their rights to equal protection of the laws
under the fifth amendment and the civil rights conspiracy statute. Wallace v.
Chappell, 661 F.2d 729, 730 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
65. 462 U.S. at 304. Congress has exercised its plenary constitutional au-
thority to govern military affairs, by creating a military justice system. This sys-
tem serves as the proper forum for servicemembers to air grievances. The
Chappell Court considered the military justice system to be an appropriate mech-
anism to address service-related claims of abusive or discriminatory treatment.
Id. at 302-03. Specifically, the Court identified article 138 of the Uniform Code
of MilitaryJustice and the Board for the Correction of Naval Records (BCNR) as
available remedies for the servicemember. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. § 938 (1982) (article
138 of UCMJ affords formal complaint procedure to wronged servicemember);
10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1982) (BCNR is civilian board authorized to correct ser-
vicemember's military record due to error or injustice). These intramilitary
remedies are consistent with both the traditional deference afforded Congress in
the control over military affairs, and the judiciary's reluctance to interfere with
the military. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (Congress af-
forded greatest deference in context of its authority over national defense and
military affairs); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[t]he complex, sub-
tle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and
control of a military force are" properly controlled by Congress and not within
the competence of courts); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953) ("[T]he
military constitutes a specialized community governed by separate discipline
11
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noted that "[t]he 'special factors' . . . also formed the basis of this
Court's decision in Feres ... [and] the Court's analysis in Feres guides our
analysis in this case." ' 66 In recognition of the military's unique discipli-
nary structure and Congress' plenary authority to govern certain mili-
tary affairs, the Chappell Court adopted the Feres rationales as the basis
for denying a Bivens remedy to a servicemember alleging a constitutional
tort.
In United States v. Stanley,6 7 the Court reversed a narrow interpreta-
tion of Chappell and defined the "special factors" analysis using the Feres
"incident to service" language. 68 The Court considered the case of
James B. Stanley, who was secretly administered doses of lysergic acid
diethylamide (LSD) under the guise of an unrelated Army equipment
test.6 9 As a result of the LSD exposure, Stanley suffered hallucinations,
periods of incoherence, memory loss and impaired military perform-
ance.70 Severe personality changes caused the dissolution of his mar-
riage, and in 1969 he was discharged from the Army.71 Stanley was first
notified of these surreptitious LSD experiments in 1975. In an attempt
to recover damages, he first brought a negligence claim against the gov-
ernment and later filed a claim for violation of his constitutional
rights. 72 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted Chappell to permit enlisted military personnel to bring a Biv-
ens claim, if such claim did not compromise the officer-subordinate rela-
tionship. 7 3 The Supreme Court, however, concluded that the bar to a
...*. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to
interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to
interfere in judicial matters.").
66. 462 U.S. at 298-99. The Chappell Court adopted the Feres rationales to
bar servicemembers' claims for violations of constitutional rights that occur "in-
cident to service." Id.
67. 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987).
68. Id. at 3063. The Court reaffirmed the Chappell reasoning and noted that
the " 'special factors counselling hesitation' " included " 'the unique disciplinary
structure of the Military Establishment and Congress' activity in the field.' " Id.
69. Id. at 3057.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 3058. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate courts' decision
to award recovery and denied relief to Stanley, asserting that "no ... remedy is
available for injuries that 'arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.' " Id. at 3063 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146). The Court clearly as-
serted that the "incident to service" bar to recovery was as extensive in a Bivens
action as in a negligence claim under the FTCA. Id.
73. Id. at 3059. The district court decided that Chappell did not "totally
ba[r] Bivens actions by servicemen for torts committed against them during their
term of service." 574 F. Supp. 474, 478 (S.D. Fla. 1983). The court of appeals
affirmed on essentially the same grounds. Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d
1490, 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit's opinion attempted to char-
acterize the "special factors" identified in Chappell (unique disciplinary structure
of the military establishment) as limited to the officer-subordinate relationship.
Id. at 1495. The court distinguished Chappell, and asserted that "[t]he special
[Vol. 33: p. 175
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol33/iss1/4
servicemember's suit for a constitutional injury is "as extensive as the
exception to the FTCA established by Feres and United States v. John-
son." 7 4 Consequently, the Court held "that no Bivens remedy is available
for injuries that 'arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service.' "75
B. Feres Doctrine and Negligent Torts: United States v. Johnson
Unlike the situation in Stanley, involving a constitutional tort claim,
"incident to service" has long been the standard requirement for recov-
ery in servicemembers' suits against the United States based on the neg-
ligence of government employees. 76 Thus, in United States v. Johnson,77
the Court granted certiorari to review a reformulation of the Feres doc-
trine which focused on the distinction between a civilian governmental
tortfeasor and a fellow servicemember. 78 In Johnson, Lieutenant Com-
mander HortonJohnson was on a Coast Guard rescue mission over Ha-
waii.79 While under the positive radar control of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Johnson crashed into the side of a mountain,
thereby killing himself and his entire crew. Johnson's widow brought a
wrongful death action against the United States alleging that the FAA
flight controllers negligently caused her husband's death. 80 Because
Johnson died "during the course of activity incident to military service,"
the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and denied
FTCA relief.8 1 The Court refused to create an exception to the "inci-
dent to service" test by distinguishing suits alleging negligence on the
part of civilian employees of the Federal Government.8 2 Rather, the
Court applied the test previously set forth and asserted that the status of
nature of military life, the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military
officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel" were not impli-
cated by the facts in this case. Id. (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304).
74. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3063.
75. Id. (citation omitted).
76. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
77. 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987).
78. Id. at 2066. This distinction was a source of conflict among the Circuit
courts. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit, in a "strik-
ingly similar" case, reached the opposite conclusion. Johnson v. United States,
749 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11 th Cir. 1985); see, e.g., Uptegrove v. United States, 600
F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1979) (widow of naval officer was barred by Feres in suit
against government, which alleged negligence of three FAA air traffic control-
lers in controlling military aircraft), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980).
79. 107 S. Ct. at 2064-65.
80. Id. at 2065.
81. Id. at 2069. In support of its holding, the Court demonstrated that
(1) Johnson was engaged in the specific military mission that caused his death
because of his military status, (2) Mrs. Johnson received and continues to receive
statutory benefits and (3) Johnson was acting in accordance with Coast Guard
standard operating procedures, which indicate that a suit would substantially
implicate military discipline. Id.
82. Id. at 2066-67 (emphasis added).
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the tortfeasor had no bearing on the Feres analysis. 83 Relying on the
"three broad rationales," 84 the Court affirmed its holding in Feres and
denied relief to Johnson's widow. 85
As this background demonstrates, the right of a servicemember to
sue the federal government for negligence under the FTCA or to re-
cover a Bivens remedy for a constitutional tort depends on successfully
clearing the "incident to service" hurdle. Recovery will be awarded in
either case if a military plaintiff can show that the injury sustained was
not "incident to service." In analysis, this Note will address how the
lower courts have defined this broad language, and a workable definition
for the Supreme Court to adopt will be proposed based on its underly-
ing rationales for the doctrine.
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court announced in Stanley that the threshold re-
quirement for recovery for servicemembers injured by constitutional
torts hinged on the broad "incident to service" rule introduced by the
Feres doctrine over thirty-six years ago. 86 Unfortunately, the test used to
determine the fate of the servicemembers' constitutional rights has not
been satisfactorily defined by the Court.8 7 Additionally, in the absence
of any definition or analytical framework, the lower federal courts have
not agreed on what constitutes "incident to service."8 8 This inconsis-
tency, resulting from the Supreme Court's nebulous definition of the
critical "incident to service" language, has forced military plaintiffs to go
forward with FTCA suits, often unnecessarily, since it is difficult to pre-
dict the outcome of such claims based on stare decisis.8 9
A. The Supreme Court's Treatment of "Incident to Service"
The Supreme Court has never explicitly defined the term "incident
to service." Rather, it has concentrated on refining and explaining the
underlying foundation of the Feres doctrine. 90 Lower federal courts
have relied on these rationales to shape a definition of "incident to ser-
83. Id. at 2066 & n.7.
84. Id. at 2068-69. The Court acknowledged "three broad rationales" for
the Feres doctrine, but the Court has also frequently identified the military disci-
pline rationale as the most important rationale for the doctrine. For a full dis-
cussion of these three broad rationales, reaffirmed in Stencel and cited in this
case, see supra notes 35-50 and accompanying text.
85. 107 S. Ct. at 2069.
86. For a discussion of the facts and holding in Stanley, see supra notes 67-75
and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
88. For a discussion of the numerous approaches to "incident to service"
by the lower federal courts, see infra notes 101-89 and accompanying text.
89. See Comment, supra note 5, at 1183; Note, supra note 7, at 1118-26.
90. See supra note 5. For a discussion of the development of the underlying
foundation of the Feres doctrine, see supra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33: p. 175
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vice." 9 1 The Court's decision in United States v. Shearer,92 which shifted
the balance among the three underlying rationales, has been used by
numerous federal courts to reform their "incident to service" tests. 9 3
In Shearer, the Court asserted that "[t]he Feres doctrine cannot be
reduced to a few bright-line rules .... -94 However, the Court held that
the most important rationale for the Feres doctrine was the "military dis-
cipline" rationale. The Court further identified the components of this
rationale: (1) "whether the suit requires [a] civilian court to second-
guess military decisions ... and" (2) "whether the suit might impair
essential military discipline."'9 5 Although not expressly overruling the
other two Feres rationales, the Court further stated that they were "no
longer controlling.' '96 The Shearer Court's attempt to articulate how to
properly weigh each of the Feres rationales sent a signal to lower courts
to rely primarily on the "military discipline" rationale in their formula-
tion of an "incident to service" test. 9 7 However, even after Shearer, the
lower courts have differed in their approaches, and several did not adopt
the Shearer dicta as controlling.9" In addition, the Johnson Court appears
to have breathed new life into the rationales deemed "no longer con-
trolling" in Shearer.99 Consequently, the Court has sent an ambiguous
91. For a discussion of the various lower court definitions of "incident to
service," see infra notes 101-89 and accompanying text.
92. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). Private Shearer, who was off duty and away from
base, was kidnapped and murdered by another servicemember. Id. at 53. Re-
spondent, Shearer's mother, brought suit under the FTCA, alleging that the
Army "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control
over" the alleged murderer and "failed to warn other persons that he was at
large." Id. at 53-54. The Court held that "[t]his allegation goes directly to the
,management' of the military; it calls into question basic choices about the disci-
pline, supervision, and control of a serviceman." Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
As a result, respondent was denied recovery. Id. at 59.
93. For a discussion of Shearer's impact on an "incident to service" defini-
tion among lower federal courts, see infra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
94. 473 U.S. at 57.
95. Id. (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 58 & n.4. For a full discussion of the (1) distinctively federal rela-
tionship and (2) the alternative compensation rationales, see supra notes 40-44
and accompanying text.
97. Jones v. La Riviera Club, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1032, 1035-36 (D.P.R.
1987) (key factor and chief rationale of Feres is Supreme Court's mandate that
civilian courts must not "second-guess military decisions."). For a discussion of
the post-Shearer "incident to service" definitions, see infra notes 163-89 and ac-
companying text.
98. For a discussion of the disparity among the circuits concerning the "in-
cident to service" test, see infra notes 101-89 and accompanying text.
99. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2068-69. Despite the endorsement of the "three
broad rationales" in Johnson, it is unclear whether the Court intended to dimin-
ish the importance it had previously placed on the "military discipline" ration-
ale. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 (military discipline rationale is best explanation
for Feres doctrine); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 299-300 (Feres is best explained by mili-
tary discipline rationale); see also Johnson v. United States, 704 F.2d 1431, 1436
(9th Cir. 1983) (safeguarding military discipline is fundamental rationale for im-
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signal to the lower courts with regard to the definition of "incident to
service."' 0 0 Specifically, the question of how much weight should be
accorded each rationale in the Feres analysis has been left open for
debate.
B. The "Incident to Service" Confusion Among the Federal Courts:
Evolution of a Definition
Some federal courts take a simplistic approach to the Feres doctrine
by defining "incident to service" as any injury occurring while the plain-
tiff is serving on active duty. This restrictive approach effectively denies
servicemembers a remedy for any injury.' 0 ' Other courts employ a
more sophisticated analysis and consider some or all of the following
factors in determining whether an injury has occurred incident to ser-
vice: (1) duty status of the injured party, (2) place of the injury, (3) na-
ture of the activity engaged in at the time of the injury and (4) whether
the plaintiff was under orders or compelled to act. 10 2 After Shearer,
some courts have further refined the analysis by focusing primarily on
the effect of a suit on military discipline and the amount of second-
guessing required by a civilian court.' 0 3 However, there is still no uni-
munity); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 132 (9th Cir. 1981) (" '[T]he
protection of military discipline ... serves largely if not exclusively as the predi-
cate for the Feres doctrine .... Only this factor can truly explain the Feres doc-
trine and the crucial line it draws .... ") (quoting Hunt v. United States, 636
F.2d 580, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989 (1982).
100. Compare Atkinson v. United States, 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), with-
drawn, 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1987) with Reilly v. United States, 665 F. Supp.
976 (D.R.I. 1987). For a discussion of Atkinson and Reilly, see infra notes 174-89
and accompanying text.
101. See Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1140 (4th Cir. 1975) (con-
trolling factor under Feres is whether servicemember is on active duty and not on
furlough, rather than whether suit would tend to interfere with military disci-
pline); Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974) (defining "incident to
service" as injury sustained on active duty and stemming from military relation-
ship). For a discussion of Hass, see infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Harten, see infra notes 106-49 and accompanying text.
102. See Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987); Stubbs v.
United States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985);
Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984); Shearer v. United States,
723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983); Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir.
1980). For a discussion of Pierce, see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of Brown, see infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Stubbs, see infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Shearer, see supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Parker, see infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
103. See Sanchez v. United States, 813 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1987); Bois v.
Marsh, 801 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395
(6th Cir. 1986); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1985). For a dis-
cussion of Sanchez, see infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of Bois, see infra note 173. For a discussion of Satterfield, see infra note 172.
For a discussion of Bynum, see infra note 171.
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formity among these courts in defining "incident to service."'10 4
1. The "Active Duty" Test
The "active duty" test is the most restrictive interpretation of "inci-
dent to service," and is often employed to bar servicemember's suits in
medical malpractice cases. 10 5 It is defended on the grounds that be-
cause a servicemember takes advantage of military benefits, such as
medical care and recreational facilities solely because of his status as an
active duty servicemember, any injury related to these benefits is per se
"incident to service." In Harten v. Coons, 10 6 in which the military plaintiff
alleged negligence in the performance of an unsuccessful elective vasec-
tomy operation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit articulated this test, which focused on the "status" of the plaintiff at
the time of the injury. 10 7 In denying recovery, the court asserted that
"when a serviceman on active duty sustains an injury stemming from the
military relationship..." recovery will be denied under the Act.' 0 8 The
Harten Court concluded that "[s]urgery . . . is 'incidental to service'
when performed upon a serviceman on active duty, because the service-
man is taking advantage of medical privileges granted only to military
personnel."1 09
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit took a
similar approach in Hass v. United States. 1 0 First Lieutenant Hass was
injured while riding a horse he had rented from a stable owned and op-
erated by the Marine Corps. I I In a FTCA action, Hass alleged that the
stable managers had been negligent in failing to warn him of the
"horse's dangerous propensity to break its gait and bolt .... .,,12
Broadly interpreting the "incident to service" language in Feres,113 the
104. For a discussion of the various approaches to "incident to service"
among the lower federal courts, see infra notes 101-89 and accompanying text.
105. Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363, 1365 (10th Cir. 1974).
106. Id. at 1363. Thomas Harten, an active duty servicemember, received a
follow-up report following his vasectomy indicating that he was sterile. Id. at
1364. Subsequently, his wife became pregnant and bore a child. Id. The
Hartens filed suit, alleging negligence in both the performance of the operation
and in the writing of the sterility report. Id.
107. Id. at 1365. "Thus, if a claimant is on leave, or on an inactive status at
the time of the injury, or if the injury is not the product of a military relationship,
suit under the [Federal Tort Claims] Act may be allowed." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975). In Hass, Marine First Lieutenant Hass
filed suit against the civilian manager and assistant manager of the stable, as well
as the United States as their employer. The court held that the United States
and the civilian managers were immune from suit under the Feres doctrine and
denied the Marine recovery. Id. at 1143.
111. Id. at 1139.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1140.
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court asserted that the "relatively mechanical" test devised by Feres
hinged on the active duty status of the plaintiffs, 114 even though this
plaintiff had off-duty status at the time of the accident.' 1 5 Significantly,
the court also identified three other factors that contributed to its con-
clusion, all of which highlighted the special relationship between the
plaintiff and the military-owned and operated stable."16
A district court in the Fourth Circuit held that suits are precluded
"by military personnel 'while on active duty and not on furlough, who
are injured due to the negligence of others in the armed forces,' regard-
less of whether or not the injury to the claimant arises out of activities
related specifically to military duty."' 17 In Davis v. United States Depart-
ment of Army, 1 18 the military plaintiff, who was 24 weeks pregnant, gave
birth to a female fetus weighing 650 grams. The fetus died soon after
birth, and pursuant to hospital policy, the fetus was classified as a surgi-
cal specimen and disposed of rather than preserved.' 19 The court dis-
missed the plaintiff's claim for emotional distress damages 120 based on
the grant of immunity required by the Feres doctrine. 121 The Davis court
stated that "it is ... compelled to apply the Fourth Circuit's strict inter-
pretation of the Feres doctrine."' 122 In addition to its reliance on the
plaintiff's active duty status, the court recognized the impact of such a
suit on military discipline as "the most persuasive rationale for applying
114. Id. at 1140. The Hass court noted that in the three cases embodied in
the Feres decision: "[tihe common fact underlying the three cases is that each
claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to negli-
gence of others in the Armed Forces." Id. (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 138).
115. Id. at 1139. The court distinguished the successful plaintiffs in Brooks
and Brown by stating that "the claimants in those cases were not on active duty,
the soldiers in Brooks being on furlough and the claimant in Brown having been
discharged." Id. at 1140.
116. Id. at 1139. The appellate court affirmed the district court's "incident
to service" analysis:
In reaching this conclusion the judge relied upon his findings that
(1) Hass was on active duty though in an "off-duty" status at the time of
the accident; (2) the government owned and operated the stable for the
benefit of servicemen like Hass; (3) the stable was organized pursuant
to military order, the Marine Special Services Officer had responsibility
for its management and regulation pursuant to Special Services rules,
and Hass and other servicemen were subject to disciplinary measures
for violation of the rules; (4) and the government "obviously" sup-
ported the stable financially.
Id.
117. Davis v. United States Dep't of Army, 602 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D. Md.
1985) (citing Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975) (quoting Feres,
340 U.S. at 138)).
118. Id. at 355.
119. Id. at 356.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 361.
122. Id. at 358. For a full discussion of this interpretation, see supra notes
110-16 and accompanying text.
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1988]
the Feres doctrine to suits against the various branches of the armed
services."1
2 3
2. The Three-Pronged Parker Analysis
In Parker v. United States, 12 4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit fashioned a three-part test which analyzed the totality of
the circumstances to "determine[] whether [an] activity [is] incident to
service." 12 5 Dismissing the "active duty" or "but for" test,' 26 the court
asserted that "[m]ore is needed for the activity to be incident to military
service."'12 7 The first prong of the Parker analysis concerned the duty
status of the individual.' 28 An individual on active duty and either on
duty or merely temporarily off duty is acting "incident to service.' ' 2
9
While at the other extreme, a discharged servicemember or one on leave
or furlough is normally not acting "incident to service."' 30
The second Parker prong examines the situs of the injury. 13 1 Gen-
erally, an on-base injury is more likely to be considered an activity inci-
dent to service than an off-base injury. 13 2 However, it is significant that
courts have allowed FTCA actions even though the injuries occurred on
military property. 133 The final Parker element turned on what the ser-
123. Davis, 602 F. Supp. at 359 (footnote omitted).
124. 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980). Specialist Five Jack Parker, U.S. Army,
on authorized leave for four days, was killed, while driving home to his personal
residence, by a fellow servicemember negligently operating a military vehicle.
Id. at 1008. The military vehicle crossed the center line and collided head-on
with Parker's vehicle in Parker's lane of traffic. Id. Parker's widow filed suit pur-
suant to the FTCA. Id. The court held that Parker's activities were not incident
to service, and thus he was allowed recovery under the FTCA. Id. at 1015.
125. Id. at 1013. The three-part Parker test examines the following factors
to determine whether an activity is incident to service: (1) duty status of the
plaintiff, (2) place of the injury, and (3) the activity of the plaintiff at the time of
the injury. Id. at 1013-15.
126. For a discussion of the "active duty" or "but for" analysis, see supra
notes 105-23 and accompanying text.
127. 611 F.2d at 1011. "The test is not a purely causal one; one cannot
merely state that but for the individual's military service, the injury would not
have occurred." Id.
128. Id. at 1013.
129. Id.
130. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Watt v.
United States, 246 F. Supp. 386 (E.D. N.Y. 1965) (retired veteran is not in active
military service, and, therefore, is not barred by Feres doctrine). For a discussion
of Brown, see supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
131. 611 F.2d at 1014.
132. Id. The court recognized that this factor "should not be emphasized
above all other factors." Id. In addition, the court noted that the injured ser-
vicemember in Brooks proceeded with a FTCA claim for his injury suffered "off
the military reservation." Id.
133. Id.; see, e.g., Hand v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 38 (M.D. Ga. 1966)
(plaintiff recovered for injuries sustained in accident on highway passing
through military reservation); Downes v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.
NOTE
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vicemember "was doing at the time he was injured."' 13 4 This third fac-
tor was principally concerned with the activity's relationship to the
military service or mission itself. 135
The three-pronged Parker analysis was also employed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. 13 6 In Pierce v. United
States,"3 7 the court expressly indicated that "this circuit has adopted
[the] three part [Parker] test for determining whether the activity of a
serviceman is 'incident to service.' ",138 In Pierce, the military plaintiff
was off base, driving a private motorcycle and attending to personal
business.' 3 9 He was injured in a collision between his motorcycle and a
military vehicle which was negligently operated by a military ser-
vicemember.' 4° This injury left Pierce with a 70% disability rating, and
he was declared unfit for active duty. 14 1 In applying the Parker analysis,
the court allowed recovery because the plaintiff's injury did not arise in
the course of activities "incident to service." 142 The court further rec-
ognized that in addition to the Parker analysis, the court could find addi-
tional justification for its conclusion based on the Shearer analysis
concerning the "threat [of a suit] to the military disciplinary
structure." 143
3. Third Circuit Adds a Fourth Dimension to Parker Test
In Shearer v. United States, ' 44 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit articulated a four-part test that added a significant
N.C. 1965) (plaintiff recovered for on-base injury when exiting base on an over-
night pass).
134. 611 F.2d at 1014. The third Parker element focuses on the activity of
the servicemember, specifically asking whether he was "under military control,"
"performiig any military mission," or even engaging in military-sponsored
"recreational activities." Id.
135. See id.
136. Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349, 352 (11 th Cir. 1987).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 352 (citing Parker, 611 F.2d at 10 13-15); see also Flowers v. United
States, 764 F.2d 759, 760-61 (11 th Cir. 1985) (active duty servicemember in off-
duty status collided with negligently driven military vehicle; Parker analysis re-
sulted in denial of recovery). The Pierce court questioned the precedential value
of Flowers since it was decided so soon after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Shearer. 813 F.2d at 352 n.4. For a full discussion of the facts and holding in
Shearer, see supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
139. 813 F.2d at 350-51.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 351.
142. Id. at 354.
143. Id. The court concluded that Pierce's claim posed no threat to the
military disciplinary structure. Id.
144. 723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the facts in Shearer,
see supra note 92.
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fourth element to the Parker analysis. 14 5 In addition to the three familiar
Parker factors, the court considered "whether the injured party was act-
ing under orders or compulsion," which implicated military discipline
concerns. 14 6 As in the Parker analysis, no distributive weight was as-
signed to any of the four factors, but the court did note that "[t]he status
and activity of the injured serviceman often seem to be the controlling
factors."' 4 7 The Supreme Court ultimately reversed this holding on
precisely the question of the relative weight to be afforded each of the
factors. The Court held that military discipline was the most important
factor. 1
4 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit em-
ployed a similar four-part analysis, which it conceded was a broad con-
struction of the Feres doctrine. 14 9 In Brown v. United States,150 the court
articulated a two-part test that also considered all four factors identified
in Shearer.15' In Brown, a National Guardsman participating in training
exercises was allegedly the victim of a racially motivated "mock lynch-
ing."' 152 The plaintiff asserted that this incident had caused him to suf-
fer deep mental depression, which ultimately led to a suicide attempt
and severe and permanent injury. 15 3 The court denied recovery and
held that the plaintiff's "claims against the United States and his supe-
rior officers for failing to prevent the incident, and against his superiors
for failing to perform a proper investigation, are barred by the Feres doc-
trine." 154 Unlike previous tests, the Brown analysis placed substantially
greater weight on the impact of a servicemember's suit on military disci-
145. Shearer, 723 F.2d at 1105. The Third Circuit added the fourth element
of "whether the injured party was acting under orders or compulsion." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court further stated that "[a]pplication of [Feres] doctrine fo-
cuses on the relationship between the serviceman and the military at the time
and place the injury was sustained." Id.
148. See United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985). For a full
discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Shearer, see supra notes 92-100 and
accompanying text.
149. See Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 366-69 (8th Cir. 1984).
"[T]he better jurisprudential course, in our view, is to examine the facts of each case as they
arise and determine whether they fall within the reasons given by the Supreme Court for its
conclusion in Feres." Id. at 366 (emphasis supplied by court) (quoting Miller v.
United States, 643 F.2d 481, 491 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
150. 739 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1984).
151. Id. at 367-69. The court's analysis focused on (1) whether there is a
relevant relationship between the servicemember's activity and the military ser-
vice, and (2) whether military discipline will be impeded if the challenged con-
duct is litigated in a civil action. Id. The first question is answered by analyzing
the three factors familiar to both the Parker and Shearer analyses: (1) duty status,
(2) location of the injury and (3) the nature of the activity. Id. at 367.
152. Id. at 363.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 369.
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pline.15 5 Specifically, the court asserted that "the preservation of mili-
tary discipline is at the heart of the Feres doctrine."'' 5 6
In Stubbs v. United States, 15 7 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit employed the Brown analysis, and reemphasized the
importance of the military discipline factor.15 8 The case involved a U.S.
Army private, who claimed that she had been sexually harassed and as-
saulted by her drill sergeant during basic training. 159 This incident,
coupled with a prior (pre-service) rape, caused Private Stubbs tremen-
dous anxiety and emotional distress. 160 She ultimately committed sui-
cide. 161 The Stubbs court denied relief to the family of the suicide victim,
based on the relevant relationship between her activity at the time of the
incident and her military service, and the harmful impact of a suit on
military decision-making and discipline.162
4. The Post-Shearer Trend Toward a "Military Discipline" Test
The trend among federal courts after the Supreme Court's decision
in Shearer has been to confine the "incident to service" analysis to pri-
marily a "military discipline" analysis.16 3 The Shearer Court emphasized
that the primary focus in a Feres analysis is whether the suit requires a
civilian court to second guess military decisions and whether it will im-
pair essential military discipline. 164 Although the Shearer Court did not
articulate a specific test to guide the incident to service analysis, its opin-
ion has done much to shape the future of incident to service analysis. 165
In Sanchez v. United States, 16 6 Private Pablo Sanchez, USMC, sus-
tained serious injuries in an automobile accident, while on authorized
liberty and riding as a passenger in the private vehicle of a fellow
marine. 167 The car overturned allegedly because the employee of a gov-
ernment-owned service station had been negligent in the servicing of
the vehicle's brakes. 168 Because of the unlikelihood that such action
would either impair military discipline or allow civilian second guessing
155. Id. at 367-69. The two-part Brown test gives the military discipline fac-
tor the same emphasis as the combined effect of the other three factors. Id.
156. Id. at 368.
157. 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984).
158. Id. at 60-61.
159. Id. at 59.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 60-61.
163. See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
164. 473 U.S. at 57 (citing Stencel, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977); Chappell, 462
U.S. 296, 300, 304 (1983)).
165. See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
166. 813 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1987).
167. Id. at 594.
168. Id. The court held that Sanchez' claim was not so clearly barred by the
Feres doctrine as to permit preliminary dismissal. Id. at 596.
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of military decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the Feres doctrine did not bar the servicemember's
cause of action. 169 Specifically, the Sanchez court identified the military
discipline rationale as the primary rationale of the Feres doctrine.17
0
Similar approaches have been adopted by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 17 1 the Sixth Circuit,' 7 2 and the District of
Columbia Circuit. '
73
In Atkinson v. United States,' 74 Specialist Four Joyce Atkinson, U.S.
Army, during the second trimester of her pregnancy, was misdiagnosed
and poorly treated for pre-eclampsia, a life threatening condition.175
Allegedly, due to this negligent treatment, she delivered a stillborn child
and suffered physical injuries and emotional distress.' 76 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, relying on Shearer, held
that the Feres doctrine did not bar the suit because plaintiff's claim had
no harmful impact on military discipline.17 7 The court explicitly identi-
fied the "military discipline" inquiry as determinative in the analysis. 1
78
The Atkinson court reversed its direction, however, in light of the
Supreme Court's emphasis on "three broad rationales" inJohnson.'79 It
withdrew its opinion in Atkinson and affirmed the district court's deci-
sion: barring the suit based on Feres and Johnson.'80 The court stated
that, "[a]lthough we believe that the military discipline rationale does
not support application of the Feres doctrine in this case, the first two
169. Id. at 595-96.
170. Id. at 595.
171. See Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 562 (5th Cie. 1985) ("[lIt has
become clear that the third [military discipline] factor ... is the principal justifi-
cation for the Feres-Stencel doctrine.").
172. Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1986) (ap-
pellant's death, like Shearer's, was incident to service because cause of action
would threaten military discipline, supervision and control).
173. Bois v. Marsh, 801 F.2d 462, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (intramilitary dam-
ages actions are barred by Feres when such would entail second-guessing military
decisions and getting testimony of command personnel on command decisions).
174. 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, 825 F.2d 202 (1987).
175. Id. at 561-62.
176. Id. at 562.
177. Id. at 565. The court held that the previously employed per se bar to
military medical malpractice claims was improper. Id. at 564; see Veillette v.
United States, 615 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1980); Henninger v. United States,
473 F.2d 814, 815 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973). For a discussion of
proposed military medical malpractice reform legislation, see supra note 8.
178. 804 F.2d at 563. "[T]he overriding concerns of the doctrine are with
the effect of a tort suit in the second-guessing of military decisions or in the
impairment of military discipline." Id. (citing Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57 (1985)).
Moreover, "[i]n light of the Supreme Court's unequivocal instruction to look at
each case independently .... ," the court rejected the longstanding per se rule
prohibiting medical malpractice claims and employed the military discipline
analysis to establish FTCA eligibility. Id.
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rationales support its application."' 8' In deference to the United States
Supreme Court, the court withdrew its military discipline analysis and
employed the longstanding per se bar to all medical malpractice
claims. 182
Not all lower courts, however, were persuaded that Johnson's enunci-
ation of the three rationales was determinative of the issue. In Reilly v.
United States, ' 8 3 the court interpretedJohnson to have no effect on its mil-
itary discipline analysis.' 8 4 Serviceman Reilly and his wife brought a
medical malpractice action under the FTCA on behalf of themselves and
their baby daughter.18 5 Reilly alleged that negligent treatment during
labor and delivery by the military obstetrician resulted in devestation of
the baby's brain.'1 6 The court concluded that the Feres doctrine did not
bar the servicemember's claim for injuries suffered by witnessing the ag-
ony of his daughter in delivery.' 8 7 Relying on the "military discipline"
analysis articulated in the first Atkinson decision,18 8 the court stated that
Johnson did nothing more than repeat the basic tenents of the Feres
doctrine. 18 9
C. Clarifying the "Incident to Service" Confusion
The Supreme Court has asserted that "[t]he Feres doctrine cannot
be reduced to a few bright-line rules." 190 However, in reality, the nu-
merous tests are often employed in a per se manner to bar causes of ac-
tion. 19 1 In light of the Supreme Court's guidance in Shearer and Johnson
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 665 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1987).
184. Id. at 1016. "To the extent that Johnson merely repeats without refor-
mulating the basic tenents of the Feres doctrine, the decision does not alter my
analysis of the doctrine's inapplicability to the present case." Id.
185. Id. at 978.
186. Id. at 978-79. In addition to damages for the baby's future care and
loss of earning capacity, the parents sought damages for the loss of their daugh-
ter's enjoyment of quality of life; future pain and suffering; their own emotional
distress; their loss of their daughter's love, society and affection; and loss of each
other's love, society and affection. Id. at 983. The court awarded over eleven
million dollars in damages for the injuries to the baby. Id. at 1020. The claims
of the parents rested on an unresolved question of state law concerning a by-
stander's right to recover for emotional distress without suffering physical in-
jury. Id. Therefore, a ruling on these claims was deferred. Id. at 1020-21.
187. Id. at 1016.
188. Id. at 1015-16; seeAtkinson, 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986). This decision
was subsequently withdrawn by the court in light of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Johnson. See Atkinson, 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, 825 F.2d
202 (1987).
189. Reilly, 665 F. Supp. at 1016. "[B]y no stretch of logic can [plaintiff's
injury] be considered service-related." Id.
190. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57.
191. See Rayner v. United States, 760 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11 th Cir.) (provision
of exclusively military medical care benefits isperse "activity incident to service,"
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and the apparent trend toward a "military discipline" analysis, the ques-
tion of what is "incident to service" is ripe for review by the Court.' 9 2
Therefore, in anticipation of such review, this Note offers several recom-
mendations in an attempt to clarify the "incident to service" analysis in
order to preserve the military disciplinary structure and to protect the
rights of United States military personnel.
One universal definition of "incident to service" is not a guarantee
that these competing interests will necessarily be better served. How-
ever, such a definition will promote predictability and ease of applica-
tion, and will neither expose the government to varying standards of
liability nor expose servicemembers to remedies that "fluctuate in exist-
ence and value."' 9 3
The "incident to service" definition should hinge precisely on the
relationship of the injured party to military duty and the impact of a
cause of action on military discipline. 194 Such a standard must necessar-
ily focus on the chain-of-command implications of the servicemember's
suit. Was the member injured by a military person within the same
chain of command? Will the cause of action negatively impact the mili-
tary good order, discipline or morale of either the injured party's com-
mand or the alleged tortfeasor's command? Will the suit impose direct
scrutiny by the civilian courts of a military commander's decisions which
were within the scope of his employment? 195 If any one of these ques-
tions is answered affirmatively, it is submitted that a proper "incident to
service" test would preclude the suit.' 9 6 In addition, the "discretionary
functions" exception to the FTCA already serves as a protection for gov-
ernment employees acting within the scope of their employment.' 9 7
This exception protects most non-combat military decisions that affect
therefore, medical malpractice claims are barred by Feres doctrine), cert denied,
474 U.S. 851 (1985); Heath v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1340, 1341 (E.D. Cal.
1986) (two medical malpractice cases consolidated in Feres decision are conclu-
sive that all such claims are barred as "incident to service.' "). For examples of
decisions that apply the doctrine in this per se manner, see supra notes 105-23 and
accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 163-89 and accompanying text.
193. A singular definition of "incident to service" will remedy the concern
articulated in Feres, that servicemembers who have no control over where they
will serve should not be dependent on varying state laws for an appropriate rem-
edy. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143.
194. See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. It is suggested that the
approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in its first Atkinson decision properly consid-
ered the relevant factors and resulted in a fair analysis of the competing con-
cerns. Id.
195. For a discussion of other relevant considerations in the "military disci-
pline" analysis, see Note, supra note 7, at 1123-25.
196. This test would reach the identical result as the Supreme Court in
Johnson, since Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment, on duty
and following the Coast Guard's standard operating procedures. For a discus-
sion of the Johnson decision, see supra notes 76-85 and accompanying text.
197. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982).
1988] 199NOTE
25
Gallagher: Servicemembers' Rights under the Feres Doctrine: Rethinking Incid
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1988
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
the members in a military commander's chain of command: 19 8 all com-
bat decisions are completely protected from liability by an express ex-
ception to the FTCA.' 9 9 Yet, there are some injuries which are so far
removed from the military command environment that only an inflexible
per se rule could possibly preclude a proper remedy,2 0 0 Medical mal-
practice claims are the best examples of injuries that occur outside of the
military command structure, that would be prejudiced by a per se rule
banning tort recovery on the basis of active duty status.
A proper test for "incident to service" is one that evaluates the in-
jury in light of the two concerns identified in Shearer: (1) whether a suit
requires a civilian court to second-guess military decisions and
(2) whether the suit might impair essential military discipline. 20 1 This
"military discipline" test must necessarily consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances, including the activity and status of the injured party and the
situs of the injury, in order to answer the ultimate questions.2 0 2 There-
fore, it is suggested that any injuries incurred during regular working
hours, while "on duty," or while acting under orders or in accordance
with regulations, would be considered "incident to service" and the ser-
vicemember would be barred from recovery.2 0 3 Additionally, however,
an injury that is suffered by a servicemember far removed from the mili-
tary sphere, outside of the military chain of command, and in no way
connected with a servicemember's military duties, would not be incident
to service, and thus the injured servicemember would be permitted to
recover under the FTCA.20 4
198. It is suggested that the "discretionary functions" exception will serve
as a suitable obstacle for military plaintiffs who seek to recover when injured in a
truly "incident to service" status. For further discussion of the "discretionary
functions" exception, see Note, supra note 7, at 1121-25.
199. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (1982) ("Any claim arising out of the combat-
ant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war.").
200. It is suggested that the "military discipline" test proposed herein
might reach a result opposite that of the Supreme Court's decision in Stanley. As
Justice O'Connor stated in Stanley: "[C]onduct of the type alleged in this case is
so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply
cannot be considered a part of the military mission." Stanley, 107 S. Ct. at 3065
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Medical malpractice claims are far removed from the military discipline
structure and deserve recovery. For a discussion of the status of military medical
malpractice reform, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 92-100 and accompanying text.
202. The Parker factors are still relevant to the "military discipline" inquiry.
For a full discussion of the Parker factors, see supra notes 124-35 and accompany-
ing text.
203. It is submitted that the following decisions would reach identical re-
sults under such a "military discipline" test: Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (1983);
Pierce, 813 F.2d 349 (11 th Cir. 1987); Stubbs, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984); Parker,
611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
204. It is submitted that the following decisions would reach opposite re-
sults under such a "military discipline" analysis: Atkinson, 825 F.2d 202 (9th Cir.
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Application of this "military discipline" test would not radically im-
pair the military command structure. In fact, several cases would reach
identical results, such as in Chappell, where five sailors who alleged racial
discrimination would still be denied a Bivens remedy. 20 5 In Stubbs, the
suicide victim's family would still be denied recovery. 20 6 Similarly, the
national guardsman in Brown could not recover for being subjected to a
"mock lynching."' 20 7 Despite the compelling circumstances in the cases
aforementioned, the Feres doctrine serves a vital interest in protecting
the military command structure.
Not all injuries are sustained, however, within this broad command
structure. The "military discipline" test would permit recovery, there-
fore, in cases which are far removed from the military command envi-
ronment. Lieutenant Hass would be allowed to recover for injuries
sustained while horseback riding. The distressed mother in Davis would
be allowed to recover for emotional distress, after her dead fetus was
disposed of rather than preserved. Similarly, Specialist Four Joyce At-
kinson would recover for her physical and emotional injuries since
"[t]here is simply no connection between [her] medical treatment and
the decisional or disciplinary interest protected by the Feres doc-
trine." 20 8 Further, this test is broader than the restrictive "officer-
subordinate relationship" analysis articulated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.20 9 The chain of command
implications are, however, an important element in the "military disci-
pline" analysis.
Finally, such a definition of "incident to service" will likely result in
fewer suits by servicemembers. 2 10 The present Feres tests have not re-
1987); Hass v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis, 602 F. Supp.
355 (D. Md. 1985).
In addition, military medical malpractice claims should be considered
outside the military sphere as well. For a discussion of the status of military
medical malpractice reform, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
205. The five sailors would be denied a remedy under this military disci-
pline test because the alleged injuries were sustained within their direct chain of
command and were directly related to their military mission. For further discus-
sion of Chappell, see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
206. Private Stubbs' family could not recover under the military discipline
test, because her injuries were caused by her immediate superior incident to
basic training. For a discussion of Stubbs, see supra notes 157-62 and accompany-
ing text.
207. The guardsman could not recover under the military discipline test,
because the incident took place while he was performing his military mission.
For a discussion of Brown, see supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
208. 804 F.2d at 565. For a discussion of Atkinson, see supra notes 174-82
and accompanying text.
209. For a discussion of the "officer-subordinate relationship" interpreta-
tion of "special factors," see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
210. Under the Feres doctrine, servicemembers' suits have increased, as mil-
itary plaintiffs have attempted to distinguish Feres. See Bennett, supra note 7, at
406-11. Another author stated that Feres has created more litigation than any of
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duced suits, and one author suggests that there is no indication that
such a barrage of suits has negatively effected military discipline. 2 '
First, under such a standard, an injured servicemember could more ac-
curately predict the potential for recovery. Secondly, the required (pre-
suit) administrative claims decisions would have more finality, thereby
dissuading potential litigants who would fail under the more refined and
predictable analysis. 2 12 This result would reduce the civilian courts' re-
view of military decisions and, because of the greater degree of predict-
ability, would likely improve morale among the uniformed services. 2 13
IV. CONCLUSION
The present inadequacies in the intramilitary compensation system
for injuries to servicemembers has led some authors to call for reform or
modification of the FTCA. 2 14 The servicemember is precluded from re-
covery for all injuries sustained "incident to service," but this ambigu-
ous test has produced outlandish results. 2 15 In order to cure the ills of
this doctrine and protect the rights of our nation's servicemembers,
without disturbing the essential structure of military discipline, it is sug-
the express exceptions to the FTCA. See Note, Torts-Rights of Servicemen Under
Federal Tort Claims Act, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1129, 1129 (1967).
211. "The large number of cases ... demonstrate that the Feres ruling did
not halt tort litigation by servicemembers. It simply assured that they would
generally lose . . . . [T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by ser-
vicemembers over the past twenty-five years have degraded the military mis-
sion." Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24, 42
(1976).
212. An injured servicemember cannot immediately bring suit. The claim-
ant must first submit a proper claim to the appropriate federal agency with adju-
dicatory authority. If the claim is (1) denied or (2) does not receive final
disposition within six months of filing, then the claimant has the statutory right
to bring an action in federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1982).
213. "The policy argument for absolute immunity ... rests on the dubious
proposition that a serviceman is more likely to respect authority when he has no
recourse for the intentional or malicious deprivation of his constitutional rights.
The contrary idea-that safeguarding rights compatible with military needs will
engender respect for authority and promote discipline-is more appealing."
Note, Intramilitary Immunity and Constitutional Torts, 80 MICH. L. REV. 312, 328
(1981); cf. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 2074 (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("Or perhaps-most
fascinating of all to contemplate-Congress thought that barring recovery by ser-
vicemen might adversely affect military discipline." (emphasis supplied by
Court)).
214. For a discussion of the inadequacies of the intramilitary remedial sys-
tem and the proposed reforms, see Donaldson, Constitutional Torts and Vilitar'
Effectiveness: A Proposed Alternative to the Feres Doctrine, 23 A.F. L. REV. 171, 195-
207 (1982-83); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 999-1003.
215. See Atkinson, 804 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1986), withdrawn, 825 F.2d 202,
205 (1987); Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law. Incidence to Service MVeets Constitutional
Tort, 60 N.C. L. REV. 489, 512 (1982) (only 11 of 147 "incident to service" cases
litigated between 1955 and 1981 involved "injuries incurred in the performance
of the serviceperson's work duties.").
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gested that a "military discipline" test be adopted to define "incident to
service."
The United States Supreme Court introduced this "military disci-
pline" analysis in Shearer, and lower federal courts have applied it effec-
tively to achieve more equitable results. A carefully defined test based
on these principles will properly protect servicemembers' rights and
also serve the dual purpose of eliminating baseless claims for recovery
and reducing the civilian courts' intrusion into military affairs.
Thomas M. Gallagher
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